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Abstract in SpanishResumen: Interpretar a Peirce no constituyo más que el primer momento de una investigación seria de la iconicidad. También hay que tener en cuenta las aportaciones de la fenomenología de Husserl, de la psicología de percepción y de las ciencias cognoscitivas. Sobre todo, las antinomias interiores a la teoría semiótica y los argumentos críticos formulados entorno a la iconicidad

Argument features, clausal structure and the computation.

This paper claims that case is vP-internally interpretable and that high NP-movement is driven by (minimally) two other ‘forces’: Person checking in a position higher than Tense, and EPP (Fin) checking in a still higher position, ‘Spec,IP’. This is evidenced by ´low’ nominatives, quirky agreement, Stylistic Fronting and expletive-distribution. Another central claim of the paper is that grammar int

Hans Brask. En senmedeltida biskop och hans tankevärld

This thesis deals with Hans Brask, Bishop of Linköping 1513–1527. Earlier research about Brask has dealt with the political events, his diocesan administration and finances. I study Brask’s episcopal role in a cultural-historical context. The primary source materials are his letters. I analyse Brask’s religious, political and ethnical concepts. I study his actions in order to understand his though

Dynamics of the quasielastic O-16(e,ep) reaction at Q2 = 0.8 (GeV/c)2

The physics program in Hall A at Jefferson Lab commenced in the summer of 1997 with a detailed investigation of the 16O(e,ep) reaction in quasielastic, constant (q,) kinematics at Q20.8 (GeV/c)2, q1 GeV/c, and 445 MeV. Use of a self-calibrating, self-normalizing, thin-film waterfall target enabled a systematically rigorous measurement. Five-fold differential cross-section data for the removal of p

Essays on Negotiation and Renegotiation in Bertrand Games

This licentiate thesis consists of three separate papers that investigate the effects of negotiation and renegotiation in Bertrand games. The first paper investigates collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly where firms have different discount factors. In order to study how a collusive agreement is reached we model the equilibrium selection as an alternating-offer bargaining game. The